Jaffa, 1799

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Jaffa, 1799

By Mordechai Gichon, Tel-Aviv University

Originally published in the Journal of Napoleonic Scholarship 1998: Volume 1, Number 2, a publication of the International Napoleonic Society
Preliminaries

When composing his memoirs in St. Helena, Napoleon wrote: "Jaffa is the only harbour on the road from Damiette to here (central Palestine). The possession of this harbour was vital for the upkeep of the naval communications with Egypt, so as to enable the unloading of provisions for the army and the siege guns that were transported by ship. It would have been contrary to all rules of prudence to move against Jerusalem prior to the conquest of Jaffa." (Napoleon I, Commentaires).

By recognizing the necessity of capturing Jaffa first, Napoleon was doubtlessly motivated also by the fear that the British, with their absolute mastery of the sea after their victory at Abukir, would seize the opportunity to land Turkish forces at this port and cut his communications with the Egyptian bases.

Moreover, Napoleon was loath to be entangled in fighting in the Judean mountains. Careful perusal of the Bible and Josephus had convinced him of the difficulties of achieving success in these parts, with limited forces against a determined enemy recruited largely from the autochtone mountaineers. [1] As far as we can reconstruct, his overall strategic planning - the penetration into the mountains - was conceived as a final step, after the plains and the key fortress of St. Jean d'Acre (Acco) were subdued. The outcome of his oral and written communications with the governor and the community leaders in Jerusalem indicate that he looked forward to a peaceful entry, once above goals had been achieved. [2]

The French army, that on February 1st 1799 had left for Palestine to forestall a Turco-British invasion through the Palestinian land-bridge, reached the outskirts of Jaffa on March 3rd. The French forces, 13,000 men strong, comprised 4 infantry divisions with a strength of about 1000 men and only 1 cavalry division of 800 horses. Aside from those supporting and technical units incorporated in the divisions, there were major contingents of artillery, engineers and medical personnel, that came directly under the command of the general-en-chef's headquarters. That headquarters also had direct command over the guides, an elite unit created in Egypt for special tasks and mainly for reconnaissance. [3]
Notes

1. Gichon 1970.
2. Napoleon I, Mémoires, 48. Lichen 1994, 233-237. Roy 1865, 262.
3. Decline of the strategy of the campaign: Gichon 1962. Passage through Sinai: Gichon 1987 (Hebrew - Engl. summary). A vivid general survey of the campaign, not focused on the military details: Derogy et Carmel 1992. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the present writer. Strength of the expeditionary force: De La Jonquière 1899, 25.