He was 86 and died of complications after a series of strokes.
Mr. Henze was a CIA station chief in Turkey [1] and Ethiopia during the 1960s and ’70s and served in the Carter administration as a deputy to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski.[*]
After retiring from government service near the end of President Jimmy Carter’s term, Mr. Henze became a consultant for the Rand Corp., a think tank. He wrote widely about the history and politics of Ethiopia and Central Asia in mainstream publications and several books.
[*] [For more on Henze's life and work, read this eulogy by former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, which he prepared for delivery at a memorial service for Henze held in northern Virginia on July 17, 2011.]
Mavi Boncuk |
Paul Bernard Henze (29 August 1924, Redwood Falls – 19 May 2011, Culpeper) was an American broadcaster, writer and CIA operative. He was involved with Radio Free Europe and wrote The Plot to Kill the Pope which advocated the view that the Bulgarians were involved in an assassination attempt on John Paul II in 1981.[2]Henze encouraged Zbigniew Brzezinski in the formation of the Nationalities Working Group in 1978, of which Henze was appointed head.[3] Influenced by his friend Alexandre Bennigsen, this group advocated the promotion of islamism as a tool for undermining Soviet hegemony in Central Asia.
Perhaps his best-known book was his first, “The Plot to Kill the Pope” (1983), an investigation into the 1981 attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II, who was shot four times while addressing a crowd at St. Peter’s Square in Vatican City.
A Turk, Mehmet Ali Agca, was convicted of the shooting and spent 19 years in an Italian prison. Mr. Henze argued that Agca, who offered several contradicting explanations for his actions, had been part of a conspiracy involving the Bulgarian and Soviet secret police. His conclusion was the result of an exhaustive examination into Agca’s connections with suspected terrorist organizations.
Using a wide range of sources across Europe, Mr. Henze, who spoke fluent Turkish, reconstructed the would-be assassin’s journey to St. Peter’s via Iran, Bulgaria and Germany.
The so-called “Bulgarian connection” was endorsed by the CIA. But in 1991, former agency analyst Melvin A. Goodman told the Senate Intelligence Committee that high-ranking CIA officials had pressured staff to conclude that the Soviet KGB had ordered the pope’s assassination. “The CIA had no evidence linking the KGB to the plot,” Goodman said.
[1]
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1977–1980, VOLUME XXI, CYPRUS; TURKEY; GREECE
[Page 65]
15. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
Washington, October 15, 1977
SUBJECT
Review with Clark Clifford of Recent Developments in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Situation
Clark Clifford asked that you and the President be informed of what he told me during an hour’s review on 14 October 1977 of his recent involvement in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus situation.
He feels the climate for recent talks was greatly improved because there had been no flare-up of Greek-Turkish tension in the Aegean during the summer. Last spring the Greeks were all talking of war with the Turks. Bitsios never used this word during his talks last week with Vance and Clifford. Clifford’s net impression from talks with Bitsios is that the Greeks are no longer gripped by fear of Turkey and therefore more amenable to real bargaining after their elections, but that they have little enthusiasm for a settlement and would just as well stall indefinitely. Kyprianou made a poor impression on Clifford; he regards him as a pawn. With Makarios gone, he feels, initiative for a Cyprus settlement must all come from Athens and Ankara and both countries must keep their respective communities in Cyprus moving constructively.
The real change in the situation is on the Turkish side. After a lot of unproductive talk in larger sessions, Vance, Clifford and Caglayangil met alone for nearly two hours and Caglayangil let his hair down.2 He said his government had made a firm decision to move to settle the Cyprus problem and get the DCA approved. (This is confirmed by CIA reporting.)3 He said they were compelled to do this because of their worsening economic situation and the drain on their resources Cyprus caused. He said Demirel felt politically stronger now and felt he could keep his coalition partners under control. As soon as the Greek elections are over (20 November), Caglayangil said the Turks would start moving. (They have a National Security Council meeting scheduled for 17 November.) Concessions involving territory, constitutional arrangements and reduction of troops in Cyprus were talked about and though [Page 66]details and timing were left for the future, Clifford feels the Turks are serious and that there is, at last, some hopefulness in the situation.
During his Washington visit early this week, Caglayangil used Ardeshir Zahedi as intermediary for getting together with the hard core of the Greek lobby. He had breakfast with Brademas, Sarbanes, Eagleton and Rosenthal on 11 October. Clifford met with this group the next day and thinks he detected some slight “give” in their position, especially Sarbanes, who has been the most anti-Turkish of all. Clifford is going to sound out a wide range of other Senators and Congressmen in the next couple of weeks. Until he does that he does not want to recommend tactics for handling the DCA. He is thinking of another mission to the area in early December. The Turks made clear to him that he would be welcome.
Clifford is going at this job with zest, wisdom and patience and obviously intends to stick with it until he succeeds. I came away feeling we are very fortunate to have got him involved.
Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 10–11/77. Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information.↩
See Document 100.↩
Not further identified.↩
[2]. Golden, Jill; Yamada, Rachel. "Inventory of the Paul B. Henze papers". Online Archive of California. California Digital Library. Retrieved 16 October 2018.
[3].Kalinovsky, Artemy M. (2015). "Encouraging Resistance: Paul Henze, the Bennigsen school, and the crisis of détente". Reassessing Orientalism: Interlocking Orientologies during the Cold War. Retrieved 16 October 2018.
Born in Redwood Falls, Minn., Paul graduated from St. Olaf College and, following service in the U.S. Army in Europe, completed a master's program in Soviet studies at Harvard.
In 1952 he joined RFE as deputy political advisor in Munich to William E. Griffith. Until 1958, Paul helped shape the concept of full-service substitute or surrogate broadcasting. Having taught himself shorthand, Paul chronicled many internal RFE discussions in its formative years, some of which are available for viewing in the Hoover Institution archives at Stanford University.
Later, in a number of government positions, especially as a National Security Council staff member responsible for international broadcasting during the Carter administration, Paul was an unfailing supporter of RFE/RL.
Over the last decade, while pursuing scholarly interests in Turkey, the Caucasus, and especially Ethiopia, Paul's interest in RFE/RL was rekindled. He helped us celebrate RFE/RL’s continuing legacy in Budapest, Warsaw and Prague. He was honored by the government of democratic Poland and traveled with founding Polish Service director Jan Nowak-Jezioranski around the country. Paul even contributed a chapter on RFE's early years to the volume "Cold War Broadcasting" (Central European University Press, 2010).
When I turned to writing "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond," my book about RFE/RL (Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2010), Paul provided invaluable insights into RFE’s early years. During our many conversations at his Virginia farm he also made available volumes of private correspondences he'd had with RFE leadership during his tenure.
From his material, I learned how Paul had helped counter irresponsible suggestions made in the wake of the June 1953 East German uprising that RFE should promote violent unrest in Eastern Europe. In one letter, Paul vented his frustration at the "stupid" and "hair-brained" advice of some officials who thought RFE should advocate sabotage in Eastern Europe. Disparaging them as "psychological warriors," he wrote that "our exiles here will never carry out the kind of orders the PW-boys want to give."
In his section for "Cold War Broadcasting," Paul wrote that "Radio Free Europe was an experiment" that "by the end of the 1950s... had evolved into a semi-permanent feature of the East European political and social landscape."
That did not just happen. Paul Henze and his Munich associates – Americans and exiles alike – made it so. With his passing, we celebrate Paul Henze’s many accomplishments and adventures and we especially honor his lifelong contribution to RFE/RL.
A. Ross Johnson was a senior executive of RFE/RL from 1988 to 2002, serving as director of Radio Free Europe, director of the RFE/RL Research Institute, and acting president and counselor of RFE/RL. Johnson is the author of "Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond" (2010) and co-edited, with R. Eugene Parta, "Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" (2010).
SOURCE
No comments:
Post a Comment