Erdogan's
Moment
By BOBBY GHOSH / ISTANBUL Monday,
Nov. 28, 2011
The standout Erdogan
with his party's newly elected MPs after June's landslide
Photograph by Adem Altan
Red carpets, honor guards and gun salutes are for garden-variety
visiting politicians and monarchs: for Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Cairo put on the
kind of reception usually reserved for rock stars. Turkey's Prime Minister was
greeted at the airport by thousands of cheering fans, many holding aloft
posters of their hero. Fusillades of flashbulbs turned night into day.
Journalists eager for a quote thrust microphones into Erdogan's face, but he
was drowned out by the chanting throngs. "Erdogan! Erdogan! A real Muslim
and not a coward," went one incantation. Another: "Turkey and Egypt
are a single fist."
Totalitarian regimes routinely
orchestrate massive, faux-spontaneous welcomes for visiting dignitaries, but
the beleaguered interim administration in Cairo didn't need to rent a crowd for
Erdogan: the Turkish leader is genuinely popular across the Arab world. He was
ranked the most admired world leader in a 2010 poll of Arabs by the University
of Maryland in conjunction with Zogby International. His stock has soared
higher still since the Arab Spring. In countries where young people have risen
against old tyrannies, many cite Erdogan as the kind of leader they would like
to have instead.
A good politician knows how to milk his moment: the Cairo visit
was the first leg of Erdogan's triumphant mid-September sweep through the newly
liberated North African states. There were tumultuous welcomes, too, in Tunis
and Tripoli. Then it was time for Erdogan to take a bow on the biggest stage.
The trip culminated at the U.N. General Assembly in New York City, where
President Obama, ignoring Erdogan's recent criticism of U.S. policy in the
Middle East and his flaming diplomatic row with Israel, lauded him for showing
"great leadership" in the region.
It's not every day that a U.S.
President and the Arab street are of one mind. But like the throngs chanting
Erdogan's name (not all of them aware it is pronounced Erd-waan; the g is silent) in Egypt, Tunisia and
Libya, Obama is hoping that the new governments emerging from the ashes of old
dictatorships will look a lot like the one the Prime Minister has built over
the past eight years. Erdogan has greatly enhanced Turkey's international
reputation, has reined in its once omnipotent military, has pursued economic
policies that have trebled per capita income and unleashed new
entrepreneurship, and has for the most part maintained a pro-West stance.
He has, it is true, also
displayed an occasional autocratic streak, running roughshod over political
rivals, tossing enemies into jail and intimidating the media. Many political
analysts, in Turkey and the West, suspect his desire to rewrite the
constitution is designed to amass more executive power. But to his admirers,
these failings pale against his successes. Democratic, economically ascendant
and internationally admired: as political templates go, Turkey's is pretty
irresistible to people shaking off decades of authoritarian, impoverishing rule
— and for Westerners worried about what those people might do next.
But perhaps its greatest virtue, in the eyes of many Middle
Eastern beholders, is that the Turkish model was forged by an Islamist: Erdogan
and his Justice and Development Party — better known by its Turkish acronym,
AKP — have traditionally drawn support from the country's religious and
conservative classes and are regarded with suspicion by secular absolutists.
For Arab Islamists, Turkey's success is proof that they can modernize their
countries without breaking away from their religious moorings. Erdogan's
Western admirers see it the other way around: proof that political Islam needn't
be an enemy of modernity. And if any evidence were needed that Erdogan's way
leads to political success, the AKP won its third general election in June, by
a landslide.
But can Erdogan's way lead
Egypt, Tunisia and Libya to the political stability and economic strength
Turkey now enjoys? Erdogan claims to be ambivalent whether Arab states seek to
emulate his success. "If they want our help, we'll provide any assistance
they need," he told TIME in an interview during his visit to New York.
"We do not have a mentality of exporting our system." But he doesn't
deny reaching out to the potential leaders of the Arab Spring states: "I
intentionally wanted to talk to the presidential candidates, the new political
parties there, and I had the opportunity to get together with lots of people in
order to grasp the situation."
His message to them: be good Muslims, but make sure your constitution is, like Turkey's, secular. "Do not fear secularism, because it does not mean being an enemy of religion," he said in an interview on Egyptian TV. "I hope the new regime in Egypt will be secular." This came as a shock to some in the Muslim Brotherhood, who retorted that they didn't need lessons from the Turk. Feathers were soon smoothed, but the episode was a reminder that Turkish Islamism, rooted in a secular democratic tradition, is not so easily transplanted to societies where neither secularism nor democracy is well understood. The template, says Michael Werz, a Turkey expert at the Center for American Progress, "can be inspirational for Arab Islamist parties, but it can't be a model."
All the same, many
politicians in the Arab Spring countries are plainly modeling themselves after
the Turkish leader. "Erdogan wears a business suit, but he prays in the
mosque. That is something we can identify with," Essam Erian, a top leader
of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, told me in Cairo in the summer. (There's an
obvious echo in the name of the Brotherhood's new political arm: Freedom and
Justice Party.) Abdelhamid Jlassi, a leader of Tunisia's Islamist Ennahda party
was just as starry-eyed when I met him in Tunis a few days later. "Erdogan
speaks our language," he told me. "When he speaks, we listen."
Ennahda has since won a
large plurality in Tunisia's first free elections, on Oct. 23, to form an
assembly that will write a new constitution. The Muslim Brotherhood is expected
to do just as well in elections scheduled beginning in late November. Libya is
not expected to hold elections until the middle of next year, but there, too,
Islamist groups are expected to be significant players. Where — and to whom —
they look for inspiration could change the way the world views them.
The Ideal Islamist
for some western observers, the rise of political Islam conjures up visions of extremist, reactionary states, like Afghanistan under the Taliban or Iran. That limited view informed the anxiety that greeted the AKP's 2002 election victory. Even Turkish secularists feared Erdogan would seek to undo the separation of mosque and state that is the foundation of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's Turkey. They pointed to comments Erdogan made in the 1990s, as mayor of Istanbul, like this one: "Democracy is a tram that gets you to your destination, and then you get off." Turkey's decision not to participate in the 2003 Iraq war led to fears that Erdogan would take his country out of NATO and turn away from the West.
for some western observers, the rise of political Islam conjures up visions of extremist, reactionary states, like Afghanistan under the Taliban or Iran. That limited view informed the anxiety that greeted the AKP's 2002 election victory. Even Turkish secularists feared Erdogan would seek to undo the separation of mosque and state that is the foundation of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's Turkey. They pointed to comments Erdogan made in the 1990s, as mayor of Istanbul, like this one: "Democracy is a tram that gets you to your destination, and then you get off." Turkey's decision not to participate in the 2003 Iraq war led to fears that Erdogan would take his country out of NATO and turn away from the West.
But AKP's critics were
wrong: Turkey didn't become another Iran. Apart from a quiet repeal of a
long-standing ban on the Islamic headscarf in universities last year, Erdogan's
policies have hardly been an assault on Ataturk's secular legacy. (Domestic
critics complain, however, of an Islamist agenda in the steep hiking of taxes
on alcohol and cigarettes.) And far from drifting away from the West, Erdogan
pushed harder than his secular predecessors for the ultimate Western
endorsement: admission into the European Union, whose repeated cold-shouldering
of Ankara says more about European hangups than Turkey's qualifications.
Erdogan tells TIME he is "still determined" to pursue E.U. membership
but can't help smiling at the irony that his country, once described as
"the sick man of Europe," is now economically ascendant, while many members
of the club that won't admit him are all but bankrupt.
From Zero Problems ...
For all its Islamist leanings, the AKP government also reached out to Jewish Israel and the secular Syrian regime of President Bashar Assad; previous governments in Ankara had at best cool relations with Damascus. There were overtures, too, to neighbors in the Balkans and around the Black Sea, and even to Armenia, with which Turkey has long-standing historical hostilities. These were all consistent with a doctrine Erdogan and his Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, dubbed Zero Problems: Turkey would mend fences with all neighbors and make friends anew in the wider world.
For all its Islamist leanings, the AKP government also reached out to Jewish Israel and the secular Syrian regime of President Bashar Assad; previous governments in Ankara had at best cool relations with Damascus. There were overtures, too, to neighbors in the Balkans and around the Black Sea, and even to Armenia, with which Turkey has long-standing historical hostilities. These were all consistent with a doctrine Erdogan and his Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, dubbed Zero Problems: Turkey would mend fences with all neighbors and make friends anew in the wider world.
It worked: Erdogan seemed
to form a close bond with Assad, even inviting the Syrian dictator to vacation
in Turkey. And Turkey quickly became Israel's best friend in the Islamic world
— that bar was, admittedly, low.
Zero Problems also served
Turkey's economic ambitions. Turkish entrepreneurs, nudged along by the
government — but without the overwhelming financial backing of the state
enjoyed by, say, Chinese companies — were able to rapidly grow business in the
immediate neighborhood and farther afield, notably in Africa. Turkish
construction companies in particular fanned out across the Middle East, Africa
and Asia, competing with (and often beating) Chinese rivals.
There was prosperity at
home too: since the AKP first came to power, Turkey's GDP has trebled, the
budget deficit has fallen by two-thirds. From 2002 to '10, GDP grew by a
compounded annual rate of 4.8%, more than Russia, Brazil and South Korea. In
2010, Turkey's GDP grew 8.9%; the E.U.'s grew 1.9%. Already the world's 17th
largest economy, behind South Korea, Spain and Canada, Turkey is expected to
slow this year, and some analysts warn that its economy is in danger of
overheating. But compared with much of Europe, it is a picture of health.
Emboldened by economic and
foreign policy successes, Erdogan grew more ambitious abroad. With U.S.
support, he sought to turn Turkey into a moderator of other regional rifts,
bringing Syria and Israel as close as they have ever come to peace talks. That
dream was dashed in December 2008, when Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
ordered the start of Operation Cast Lead, a three-week assault on Gaza that
left more than 1,300 Palestinians dead. Israel said it was provoked by rockets
fired from Gaza; Syria withdrew from Erdogan-brokered negotiations.
Associates of the Turkish
leader say he was personally affronted. Olmert, he felt, had left him holding
the bag. His anger boiled over at a panel discussion in Davos, when he stormed
off after telling Israeli President Shimon Peres, "You know very well how
to kill."
Relations with Israel
limped along for a while before breaking down completely in May 2010, when
Israeli commandos halted a Turkish-led aid flotilla bound for Gaza. In
international waters, the commandos rappelled down into the Mavi
Marmara, a ship belonging to a Turkish charity. In the fighting that broke
out, eight Turks and one Turkish American were killed. Israel says its soldiers
were attacked on board.
Turkey has since all but
broken off relations with Israel. Erdogan says nothing short of a formal
apology and the lifting of Israel's blockade of Gaza will repair a once
promising friendship. "The Israeli government is not being honest at
all," he tells TIME. Israel has responded with angry rhetoric of its own:
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman suggested one way to get back at Erdogan
would be to support the Kurdish terrorist group known as the PKK, which has
recently stepped up attacks against Turkish military and civilian targets.
(Turkey accepted Israel's aid after a devastating Oct. 23 earthquake in Van
province killed over 600, but Davutoglu said that would not soften Turkey's
position.)
... To Plenty of Problems
The Arab Spring finally made the Zero Problems doctrine untenable. Although Erdogan was ahead of many Western leaders in calling for Egypt's Hosni Mubarak to step down in the face of a popular uprising, he was hesitant to send the same message to Syria's Assad and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi: Turkey had sizable business interests and expat populations in both countries. Erdogan initially resisted pressure to join the NATO campaign against Gaddafi and maintained that his relationship with Assad would allow him to coax the Syrian leader into implementing political reforms. "Erdogan thought of himself as Assad's tutor," says F. Stephen Larrabee, an expert on Turkey at the Rand Corp. "He overestimated his ability to persuade Assad."
The Arab Spring finally made the Zero Problems doctrine untenable. Although Erdogan was ahead of many Western leaders in calling for Egypt's Hosni Mubarak to step down in the face of a popular uprising, he was hesitant to send the same message to Syria's Assad and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi: Turkey had sizable business interests and expat populations in both countries. Erdogan initially resisted pressure to join the NATO campaign against Gaddafi and maintained that his relationship with Assad would allow him to coax the Syrian leader into implementing political reforms. "Erdogan thought of himself as Assad's tutor," says F. Stephen Larrabee, an expert on Turkey at the Rand Corp. "He overestimated his ability to persuade Assad."
Erdogan belatedly changed
his mind and then acted decisively: Turkey backed Libya's transitional council
against Gaddafi, and once Assad had reneged on his promise of reforms (another
slight Erdogan took personally), it began calling for regime change in
Damascus. Whereas once he had invited the Assad family to holiday in Turkey,
Erdogan grew openly contemptuous of the Syrian strongman. "It is
impossible to preserve my friendship with people who are allegedly leaders when
they are attacking their own people," he says. Turkey now provides shelter
not only to refugees from Assad's crackdown but also to opposition groups that
are actively plotting his downfall.
The break with Israel and Syria may have dashed Erdogan's hopes of
being a regional peacemaker. It also greatly complicates matters for the U.S.,
which had hoped Turkey could gradually draw Syria away from the Iranian sphere
of influence. Nor does it help that the U.S.'s two closest allies in the
region, Turkey and Israel, are now at loggerheads. Pro-Israel Congressmen have
threatened to block military supplies to Turkey, giving the White House yet
another brush fire to put out. The consequences for Turkey are uncertain. Erdogan's anti-Israel
rhetoric plays well with the AKP voter base and Arab audiences. But by turning
on Assad, says Rand's Larrabee, Erdogan also risks antagonizing Syria's
sponsor, Iran. Relations with Tehran have already cooled since Turkey agreed in
September to install new NATO radar systems designed to detect missiles
launched from Iran. Erdogan long pushed back against the radars for fear of
antagonizing the Iranians. Now Turkish officials are seeking cover behind the
fig leaf that data from the systems will not be shared with Israel; NATO says
that's just not true. So much for Zero Problems.
The New Ottoman Empire
Inevitably, Erdogan's new foreign policy doctrine, aimed at increasing Turkey's political and economic influence in the Middle East and North Africa, has been dubbed "neo-Ottoman," after the dynasty that ruled much of the Muslim world from Istanbul for 600 years until shortly after World War I. Erdogan doesn't shirk from the comparison. "Of course, the empire had some beautiful parts and some not-so-beautiful parts," he says. "It's a very natural right for us to use what was beautiful about the Ottoman Empire today." Turkish officials envision an arrangement similar to the British Commonwealth, with a constellation of Balkan, East European and Arab states all looking to Istanbul for benign guidance.
Inevitably, Erdogan's new foreign policy doctrine, aimed at increasing Turkey's political and economic influence in the Middle East and North Africa, has been dubbed "neo-Ottoman," after the dynasty that ruled much of the Muslim world from Istanbul for 600 years until shortly after World War I. Erdogan doesn't shirk from the comparison. "Of course, the empire had some beautiful parts and some not-so-beautiful parts," he says. "It's a very natural right for us to use what was beautiful about the Ottoman Empire today." Turkish officials envision an arrangement similar to the British Commonwealth, with a constellation of Balkan, East European and Arab states all looking to Istanbul for benign guidance.
But invoking a long-gone —
and not especially lamented — empire is no basis for foreign policy. The
competition for influence in the new Middle East emerging from the Arab Spring
is bound to be fierce. Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the region's traditional
powers; there are American and European fingers in the pie too. Relative
newcomers China and India have a growing economic interest in the region.
Turkey's head start in the Arab Spring countries — it is already one of the
largest investors in Egypt and Libya — will be difficult to maintain.
If there's growing
competition for Turkey abroad, for Erdogan there are also growing problems at
home. That autocratic tendency has become more pronounced since June's huge
election win. Political rivals complain that he has never quite shaken off the
bullying streak he developed in the mean streets of Istanbul's Kasimpasa
neighborhood. Despite his lofty position, he rarely misses a chance to rub his
opponents' noses in the dirt, often using crude rhetoric unbecoming of a leader
who aspires to statesmanship. He is notoriously thin-skinned about criticism
and paranoid about coups. (This last is perhaps understandable: the Turkish
military overthrew four elected governments in the 40 years before the AKP's
2002 victory.) For all its desire for Turkey to be seen as a modern state equal
in freedoms to any in Europe, his government has jailed 68 journalists,
accusing them of complicity in coup plots. On a recent trip to Istanbul, two
top journalists agreed to talk with me about Erdogan only if I promised not to
name them.
Erdogan's treatment of
Turkey's Kurdish minority had fluctuated between promises of political
compromise and old-fashioned military repression. Violence has flared in recent
months after a series of tit-for-tat attacks between the PKK and Turkish
forces. Sezgin Tanrikulu, deputy chairman of the main opposition party, the
Republican People's Party, scoffs at Erdogan's international popularity:
"Before Turkey can be held up as a role model for the Middle East, it
needs to sort out its own domestic conflicts."
Conflicts in the
neighborhood will have an impact on Turkey's economy: trade with Syria, a major
partner, is imperiled by Erdogan's open falling out with Assad. The longer the
dictatorship lingers in Damascus, the greater the cost. Antagonistic relations
with Israel have not yet had a great economic effect, mainly because trade
between the two countries is relatively small.
In the political arena,
Erdogan's next challenge is to rewrite the Turkish constitution. Fears that he
will dilute Turkey's secularism have been replaced by a growing concern that he
will push for executive power to be concentrated in the office of the
President, and then seek that office himself. The Turkish presidency is
currently a mostly ornamental position, held by Erdogan's longtime ally
Abdullah Gul. Istanbul salons are rife with talk of the two men switching roles
after the constitution is rewritten, drawing inevitable comparisons to the
Medvedev-Putin swap in Moscow. It's a testament to how far the Islamist icon
has come that his critics no longer worry that he may turn Turkey into another
Iran. They now fear he will turn it into another Russia.
— with reporting
by Pelin Turgut / Istanbul
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